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New technologies test the judicial conscience. On the one hand, they hold
out the promise of more effective law enforcement.... On the other hand,
they often achieve these ends by intruding, in ways never before imaginable,
into the realms protected by the Fourth Amendment.... The good news
[with DNA Fingerprinting] is that it lets police identify people far more
easily than would be possible using retro technology. The bad news is that
those people could well be us. I
Mayor Michael Bloomberg recently proposed taking DNA samples from
all individuals arrested in New York City.2 Similarly, police in Daytona
Beach, Florida recently announced that they will begin seeking DNA
samples from all individuals they arrest in the hopes of capturing a serial
murderer.3 Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley, joined by the State
Attorney General, recently made a personal appeal to the state legislature for
a law requiring the taking of DNA samples from individuals arrested for
certain violent felonies.4 These actions highlight what is an increasing trend
in the area of DNA collection. More and more states and law enforcement
* J.D., The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, expected 2009; B.S. in
Biology, The College of William & Mary, 2004.
1 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 871 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting).
2 Jim Dwyer, License, Registration And DNA, Please, N.Y. TIMES, January 19,
2008, at B 1. "In fact, the city hopes to develop portable machinery to test suspects at
crime scenes, even before any arrest." Jim Dwyer, Mayor Turns Suddenly Shy About
Money, N.Y. TIMES, April 11, 2009, at A12.
3 Kristen Reed and Rachael Jackson, Daytona Cops to Take DNA in All Arrests,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, February 7, 2008, available at http://www.orlandosentinel.com/
news/local/volusia/orl-dna07O8febO7,0,476106.story. The Daytona Beach chief of police
responded to this story by emphasizing that police will only be seeking these DNA
samples through consent. Mike Chitwood, Daytona Police Don't Coerce for DNA
Samples, or Keep All, DAYTONA BEACH NEWS J., March 1, 2008, at A5. Nonetheless, a
bill recently proposed to the Florida legislature would require DNA collection from
individuals arrested for certain violent and sexual crimes. Eileen Zaffiro, Lynn Pushes
Bill to Collect DNA ofAll Suspects, DAYTONA BEACH NEws-JOURNAL, March 4, 2008, at
A7.
4 Timothy B. Wheeler, O'Malley Urges DNA Collection, BALTIMORE SuN, February
14, 2008, at B2.
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agencies are seeking to obtain DNA samples from individuals suspected of a
crime but not yet convicted.
The traditional way to obtain DNA from an individual suspected of a
crime has been to obtain a search warrant based on probable cause. When the
probable cause standard cannot be met, however, police must resort to other
methods of obtaining DNA. Among the more creative ways are to either
surreptitiously collect the DNA through trickery or deception5 or gather it
after it has been discarded. 6 In addition to these, more effective-albeit less
creative-ways are also increasingly being used. Laws requiring individuals
to submit to a DNA sample upon conviction and storage of these samples in
large databases are the primary method through which the potential of DNA
in law enforcement has been employed.' The contents of these databases are
scanned for a match with a sample usually taken from a crime scene or
victim. The effectiveness of this technique, however, is dependent on the size
of the database.
In recent years, the federal government has sought to enlarge the federal
database-the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS). The DNA
Fingerprint Act of 2005, passed with little attention as Title X of the
Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization, allows the federal
government to take and retain DNA samples from anyone charged with a
federal crime or whose DNA has been collected pursuant to any state law.8
All states require persons convicted of certain crimes to submit to DNA
testing, but as the proposal by Mayor Bloomberg mentioned earlier suggests,
more and more state legislatures have passed laws requiring DNA samples be
taken from various groups of arrestees as well.
A number of these laws requiring individuals to submit to testing have
been challenged on the grounds that they authorize unreasonable searches in
5 See State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 37-38 (Wash. 2007) (holding that an individual
has no privacy interest in DNA left on envelope mailed to police and that police
deception in tricking him into mailing the letter to them was not a violation of due
process).
6 Carolyn Thompson, Police DNA Collection Sparks Questions, USA TODAY, March
17, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-03- 17-dna-
collectionN.htm?csp=34. Police in this case followed a man suspected of committing a
rape and stabbing over thirty years ago and gathered DNA from his saliva after he spat on
the sidewalk.
7 DNA can also be taken pursuant to a simple warrant supported by probable cause.
For a general overview of legal challenges made to DNA collection and retention actions
made through the 1990s, see Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and Policy
Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Databanks, 67 BROOK. L. REv.
127, 132-57 (2001).
8 DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14132(a)(1)(B)-(C) (2006). For a
discussion of the full scope of this, see infra, Part II.B.
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violation of the Fourth Amendment. Most have been upheld; though they
have divergent rationales and have typically involved statutes involving
individuals who have been convicted of crimes, not arrestees. 9 Cases
addressing the constitutionality of requiring DNA samples from arrestees,
specifically, are fewer in number and suggestive of more of a split. The
Supreme Court has yet to address the constitutional limits of such databases
and the rationale that may help define these limits.
Because the number of states requiring arrestees to submit to DNA
testing is increasing at an alarming rate, however, the Court is likely to be
forced to address their constitutionality in one form or another in the coming
years. Arrestee DNA testing is substantially distinct from the testing of
convicted persons. Perhaps the most important distinction to be made is in
the precise characteristics of the group affected by such laws. Those
individuals who are forced to give up their DNA under arrestee statutes can
essentially be divided into two groups: those that are ultimately found guilty
of the crime for which they have been arrested and those that are not. Those
in the first group are not really representative of a gain for law enforcement
because their DNA would likely be submitted anyway upon conviction under
the statutes requiring those convicted of certain crimes to submit to DNA
sampling. Instead, it is the second group of individuals that represents the
additional gain achieved in the investigation of past and future crimes. What
is noteworthy-and troublesome-about this second group, however, is that
it can be defined, as mentioned, as that group of arrestees who are not guilty
of the crime for which they have been arrested-whether it is through a
verdict of not guilty, dismissal of charges, or immediate release after the
submission of the sample. If the requirements of reasonableness and probable
cause in the Fourth Amendment are to mean anything, surely they must mean
that forcible submission to physically invasive searches by a group that is not
guilty of the crime that has put them in the government's sights is
impermissible.
The use of DNA as an accurate and helpful form of identification is no
doubt a very legitimate-and even just-method of law enforcement. That
said, the combination of databases quickly expanding to include innocent
persons, increasingly novel ways of using the information contained in our
9 Compare United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2007) (using a
balancing test), Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir. 2007) (same),
United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2006) (same), and United States v.
Castillo-Lagos, 147 Fed. App'x 71, 75 (11th Cir. 2005) (same) with United States v.
Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2007) (using the "special needs" test), and United
States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 772-74 (7th Cir. 2006) (same). The Sixth Circuit has
upheld the 2004 Act under both tests. United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 677-81 (6th
Cir. 2006).
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DNA, 10 and recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence from courts around the
country is resulting in a state of affairs that is very likely incongruent with
the proper scope intended by the Fourth Amendment. In Part II, this Note
will give background information about the usefulness of DNA in criminal
investigations and an overview of current state and federal DNA collection
statutes. Part III describes the Fourth Amendment challenges that have been
made to many of these laws and the differences in the rationales given by the
courts, and explores how some of these rationales might apply to newer,
more inclusive laws covering arrestees. Lastly, Part V argues that DNA
collection statutes seeking forcibly to require individuals merely arrested for
a crime should not be found constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
II. BACKGROUND
The usefulness of DNA to law enforcement authorities is a relatively
recent discovery. Indeed, the structure of DNA has been known for only
approximately forty years, and scientists are still not completely sure of how
every aspect of it functions. In order to fully understand why DNA is an
10 Researchers have begun to study an alleged link between genetics and certain
criminal or violent behaviors with their findings being incorporated into legal arguments
made in the courtroom. See Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Genetic
Predictions of Future Dangerousness: Is There a Blueprint for Violence?, 69 S.P.G. LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 301 (2006) (questioning whether biological knowledge of violence
and sexual violence should factor into sentencing proceedings and problems inherent in
this practice); Deborah W. Denno, Revisiting the Legal Link Between Genetics and
Crime, 69 S.P.G. LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 209, 220-38 (2006) (discussing the
prevalence of genetic arguments being made on behalf of defendants facing murder
convictions and the courts' skeptical response); David H. Kaye, Behavioral Genetics
Research and Criminal DNA Databases, 69 S.P.G. LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 259, 260
(2006) (arguing that evidence of a "crime gene" is "scientifically naive," that databases
would not be useful in behavioral research, and that many states already prohibit medical
research being done from DNA samples in databanks). However, further advancement in
these areas may provide police with a new use for DNA databases. Rather than starting
with a DNA sample from a crime scene to which individualized suspicion attaches and
using the database to identify the sample, databases may be used as a starting point in an
investigation by grouping samples in the database according to their genetic profiles for
violence, aggression, or introversion and then focusing an investigation on those
individuals whose profiles match that of the unknown suspect, as described by a witness
or evidenced through a crime. Whether such use of a database could be used to obtain a
warrant is questionable.
Additionally, phenotypic details such as eye color and hair color can be gleaned
from DNA samples. Tania Simoncelli & Sheldon Krimsky, Am. Const. Soc'y for L. and
Pol'y, Issue Brief, A New Era of DNA Collections: At What Cost to Civil Liberties? at 11
(2007), available at http://www.acslaw.org/node/5352. Thus, the potential for DNA to be
used in this way underscores the sheer intimacy of personal details that may be exposed
to the public through our genetic code.
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especially potent tool in solving crime, it is necessary to understand a bit
about what DNA is and how it functions as a unique identifier of individuals.
With this, it becomes easy to see why so many states have sought to seize
upon its potential for solving crimes. Their laws have taken a variety of
forms, but there is a clear trend in the United States towards requiring
arrestees to give DNA samples to the police."
A. A Primer on DNA and Why it's Useful in Law Enforcement
Every cell in the human body contains 46 chromosomes, each of which
consists of an extraordinarily long and highly compacted chain of DNA,
which stands for deoxyribonucleic acid. 12 DNA, in turn, is structured as a
double helix, with each of the long "backbones" made up sugars and
phosphate groups.1 3 Planted along the length of each backbone are polymers
known as nucleotides, which come in four different forms: adenine, thymine,
guanine, and cytosine. 14 The connection between the two backbones is made
by hydrogen bonds connecting individual nucleotides. 5
The precise order of the different nucleotides serves as instructions on
how to create different proteins and, ultimately, to direct the functioning of
the cell.' 6 While all humans share an enormous amount of similarities in the
order of nucleotides, there are sufficient differences between individuals to
provide each individual with a completely unique pattern, or code.' 7 It is this
11 This trend is following behind that in the United Kingdom toward greater DNA
collection and retention. Calls have already been made to have the UK database include
everyone in the country. Rape Police Call for DNA Database on All Britons, TIMES
ONLINE, Mar. 4, 2004, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/article1037237.ece.
Currently, police in the UK are seeking to take DNA from individuals found to be
speeding or littering. Richard Ford, Police Want DNA From Speeding Drivers and Litter
Louts on Database, THE TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007, at 2. More recently, two individuals
cleared of crimes have brought suit in the European court of human rights seeking to
have their DNA samples expunged from British databases. Matthew Weaver, Britons
Begin Legal Battle of DNA Database, THE GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, February 27, 2008,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/feb/27/eu.justice. If successful, the
approximately 13% of Great Britain's database that is comprised of individuals never
convicted of a crime may have to be destroyed. Id.
12 NEIL A. CAMPBELL, JANE B. REECE & LAWRENCE G. MITCHELL, BIOLOGY 207-08
(5th ed. 1999).
13 Id. at 78-79.
14Id. at 79.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 316.
17 Id., at 383. Close relatives share more similarities in their DNA than unrelated
persons; thus, related individuals can be identified out of an otherwise unidentified set of
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uniqueness that police departments use to identify a particular individual as
the source of DNA found at the scene of a crime. 18 In particular, the
Combined DNA Index System ("CODIS"), which is maintained by the FBI,
has specified thirteen specific regions of DNA to be used for this
identification. 9
Beyond this identity, particular regions of the string of DNA making up a
chromosome are known as genes and serve as the functional code from
which proteins are made.2° In a more ultimate sense, the particular form a
given gene takes determines everything from whether a person will have a
widow's peak or attached earlobes to whether he or she will develop cystic
fibrosis or Huntington's Disease.2' Propensities for heart disease, certain
types of cancer, and many other health problems can also be found from
looking at a person's DNA.22 As mentioned earlier, a great deal of research is
being undertaken to study the relationship between a person's particular
pattern of gene expression and their pattern of behavior.23
samples. This provides DNA databases with the ability to "reach beyond" the individuals
whose DNA is contained therein to their close relatives. This approach is controversial,
but has been advanced in Boston and Denver. Jonathan Saltzman, State Police may Hunt
for a Suspect Using Kin's DNA, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 17, 2007, at A1, B3; Amy Herdy,
New DNA Testing Could Involve Shaking Down Family Tree, KUSA NEWS, May 23,
2007, http://www.9news.com/news/article.aspx?storyid=70705; see also 60 Minutes
Report on Yahoo News, DNA: Going Too Far?, June 6, 2007 (on file with author).
18 CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 12, at 382.
19 Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee's DNA a Valid Special Needs Search
Under the Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court Do?, 34 J. L.
MED. & ETH. 165, 166 (2006).
20 CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 12, at 294-95, 316.
21 Id. at 252-55; see also, DNA Fingerprints Predict Brain Disorders, WASH. POST,
Jan. 18, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/01/18/AR2008011802652.html.
22 CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 12, at 256. As a result of this, many have worried
that health insurers will begin to seek DNA samples to detect a predisposition to certain
conditions as part of the process of obtaining health insurance. Amy Harmon, Insurance
Fears Lead Many to Shun DNA Tests, N.Y. TIMES, February 24, 2008, at A25. An
industry spokeswoman has stated that insurers have no desire to seek such information,
but a recent study found that in 7 of 92 underwriting decisions for hypothetical applicants
a genetic predisposition for disease resulted in denial of coverage. Id. The House of
Representatives has passed the Genetic Nondiscrimination Act of 2007 to prohibit
insurers from discriminating on the basis of genetic information, but the Senate has yet to
take action on the bill. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-
223, 122 Stat. 881 (2008).
23 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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B. State and Federal Arrestee DNA Collection and Retention
The DNA collected by law enforcement authorities is not all contained in
a single database. A complex network of state and federal laws creates a dual
system whereby federal law provides the overall structure and enables
sharing of DNA profiles among the states, while the states themselves set the
most precise limits on whose DNA can and cannot be collected and retained.
What follows is an overview of both the federal and state laws governing
DNA collection and retention.
1. Federal Arrestee DNA Collection and Retention Statutes
The federal database, CODIS, was created in 1990 and evolved over the
course of the decade to serve as a link between the databases of each state.24
It is divided into several different indexes: convicted offenders, forensic,
arrestee (where state law permits), missing persons, and unidentified human
remains.25 By April of 2004, the database contained a total of 1,762,005
DNA profiles.26 By October of 2007, however, CODIS had been expanded to
contain 5,265,258 DNA profiles, of which, 5,070,473 profiles are from
convicted offenders and 194,785 are from forensic samples.27 No statistics
are given as to the number of profiles contained in the arrestee, missing
persons, and unidentified human remains indexes. This threefold expansion
of the number of profiles in the database can be attributed, however, to recent
federal and state laws expanding the size of DNA databases.
The DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005 expanded the collection authority of
the FBI and permits the maintenance of:
(1) DNA identification records of-
(A) persons convicted of crimes;
(B) persons who have been charged in an indictment or information
with a crime; and
(C) other persons whose DNA samples are collected under applicable
legal authorities, provided that DNA samples that are voluntarily
submitted solely for elimination purposes shall not be included in
the National DNA Index System;
(2) analyses of DNA samples recovered from crime scenes;
(3) analyses of DNA samples recovered from unidentified human remains;
24 Maclin, supra note 19.
25 Fed. Bureau of Investigation, CODIS Brochure, available at http://www.fbi.gov/
hq/lab/pdf/codisbrochure.pdf.
26 Maclin, supra note 19.
27 Fed. Bureau of Investigation, NDIS Statistics, available at http://www.fbi.gov/
hq/lab/codis/clickmap.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2009).
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and
(4) analyses of DNA samples voluntarily contributed from relatives of
missing persons.
28
Subsection (C) is notable because its reference to "applicable legal
authorities" seems to allow the inclusion of DNA samples collected pursuant
to state and local laws over which the federal government has little to no
control.29 In addition to arrestee DNA collected pursuant to state authorities,
the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 was amended in 2006 to
permit the Attorney General to collect DNA samples from "individuals who
are arrested or from non-United States persons who are detained under the
authority of the United States."3 The only way to have one's profile
expunged from CODIS is through a final court order saying that a conviction
has been overturned or that no conviction resulted from the arrest.3 1
2. State Arrestee DNA Collection and Retention Statutes
Aside from these federal laws, all states permit DNA databases in some
form or another, while fourteen now require DNA collection from certain
arrestees. Among the largest databases are California, which has 1,078,077
28 DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a) (2006).
29 An amendment to the Act made shortly after it became law struck language that
had prohibited the inclusion in CODIS of "DNA profiles from arrestees who have not
been charged in an indictment or information with a crime." Pub. L. 109-162, § 1002(1)
(2006).
30 Pub. L. 109-162, § 1004, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) (2006).
31 DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14132(d)(1)-(2) (2006). These
requirements take the form of requiring the federal government to expunge profiles
obtained through arrests under federal authority. State access to CODIS is made
contingent upon the existence of laws or rules mandating similar expungement from state
databases. Id. Thus, the current state of the law does not seem to be amenable to
challenges by arrestees to the long-term retention of their DNA in databases such as
CODIS. There have been allegations of "offline" databases, however, which include
DNA collected from individuals without their consent or oversight under state law. One
such suit was brought in New York state against an allegedly offline database being
maintained by the New York Medical Examiner's Office. See Brief for the New York
Civil Liberties Union and the Innocence Project as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant,
People v. Hendrix, Indictment No. 3668/03 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 30, 2004).
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profiles in CODIS,32 Texas, which contains 349,386 profiles,33 and New
York, which contains 289,622 profiles.
34
These states also have some of the most inclusive laws in the country. In
California, against strenuous opposition, 35 a ballot initiative was passed on
November 2, 2004, known as "The DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime, and
Innocence Protection Act," or Proposition 69. It permits the taking of DNA
samples from all persons, including juveniles, who are convicted of a felony
or sex offense, even misdemeanors.36 The ACLU Foundation of Southern
California filed a class action lawsuit against Proposition 69, challenging it
as a violation of the Fourth Amendment and Due Process. 37 The suit failed,
however, and beginning in 2009, DNA samples are required of all persons
arrested for any felony offense.3"
In Texas, all persons indicted of certain offenses, mainly sex offenses,
must submit to DNA testing, as must all persons arrested for such crimes
who have previously been convicted of one. 39 Additionally, all samples
legally collected in the course of an investigation may be included, as well,
regardless of their origin.40 Further, if any state law permits or requires the
creation of a DNA record, the results may be included in the Texas
database.4' Presumably, this would include DNA from paternity suits and
civil suits.
Louisiana authorizes samples taken from anyone arrested for a felony,
and Virginia requires that DNA samples be taken from arrestees for certain
32 Jan Bashinski, DNA Laboratory Monthly Statistics, http://ag.ca.gov/bfs/pdf/
Monthly.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2009).
33 Fed. Bureau of Investigation, NDIS Statistics for Texas, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/
lab/codis/tx.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2009).
34 New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, The NYS DNA Databank
and CODIS, http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/forensic/dnabrochure.htm (last visited Feb.
14, 2009).
35 See Laura K. Donohue, Proposition 69 Could Threaten Privacy of DNA, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 22, 2004, at E-3, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/08/22/1NG8689JT61 .DTL.
36 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 296(a)(2)(A)-(B), 296(a)(3) (West 2008).
37 Complaint at 1, Weber v. Lockyer., 365 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (N.D.Cal. 2005) (No.
04-5161).
38 CAL. PENAL CODE § 296(a)(2)(C).
39 TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 411.1471 (a)(1)(A)-(I) (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2008).
40 TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 411.142(g)(3) (Vernon 2005). Note that this language
would include DNA collected surreptitiously, as has been done in a number of other
jurisdictions. See Thompson, supra note 6; Richard Willing, Police Dupe Suspects Into
Giving Up DNA, USA TODAY, Sept. 11, 2003, at A3.
41 TEx. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 411.142(g)(4) (Vernon 2005).
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violent felonies. 42 New Mexico 43 and Kansas44 also authorize DNA samples
from certain classes of arrestees. In addition to these statutes, a clear trend
emerged in 2007 towards even greater inclusion of arrestee DNA into
databases. Alaska, Arizona, Maryland, North Dakota, South Carolina, South
Dakota, and Tennessee all enacted statutes requiring arrestee DNA sampling
of some form.45 The following table summarizes these statutes and their
coverage:
State - Statute Coverage
Alaska Alaska Stat. § 44.41.035(b)(6) Violent felonies
Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13- Numerous serious
6 10(K) felonies
California Cal. Penal Code § 296(a)(2)(C) All felonies
Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21- All felonies
2511 (e)(1) and (2)
Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:609 All felonies
Maryland Md. Code Ann. § 2-504 Crimes of violence
and burglary
Minnesota Minn. Stat. § 299C.105(1) Certain felonies
New Mexico New Mex. Stat. Ann. § 29-16- All felonies
8.1 (a)(5)
North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code § 31-13-03 All felonies,
beginning July 31,
2009
South S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-620 All felonies
Carolina
42 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:609(A)(1) (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2:1
(2004). Louisiana, it is worth noting, is also the site of a particularly well-publicized
DNA dragnet, in which police requested that citizens in a given town voluntarily submit
to DNA testing to help police narrow down their suspects to those who refuse to submit
to such tests. See Glynn Wilson, In Louisiana, Debate Over a DNA Dragnet, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 21, 2003, at 3, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/
2003/0221/p03s0l-usju.html. For an explanation of how this has also occurred in other
states such as Florida, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
43 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-16-8.1(a)(5) (LexisNexis 2007).
44 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-251 l(e)(l)-(2) (2007).
4 5 ALASKA STAT. § 44.41.035(b)(6) (2007); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-610(K)
(2007); MD. CODE ANN. § 2-504; N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-13-03 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 23-3-620; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5A-5.2; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321(e)(1)
(2007). The Tennessee law came despite an Opinion of the State Attorney General
indicating that the law was "constitutionally suspect." Tenn. Atty Gen., Op. No. 07-45
(Apr. 9, 2007).
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South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws § 23-5A-5.2 Certain felonies,
crimes of violence,
and sex offenses
Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- Violent felonies
321(e)(1)
Texas Tex. Gov't Code Ann. Certain sex crimes




Virginia Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-310.2:1 Violent felonies
Additionally, no fewer than forty-two other bills relating to DNA
collection from arrestees were proposed in state legislatures across the
country in 2007, and another 57 were proposed in 2008.46 While many of
these bills failed to make it out of committee, they serve as a clear indication
of what is to come in 2009 and beyond. Many challenges to state laws
authorizing DNA samples from convicted persons have been brought-and
been rejected-but it is only within the last year or two that decisions on the
constitutionality of arrestee DNA sampling have begun to emerge. The courts
rejecting challenges to conviction based DNA sampling have not yielded
consistent rationales for the constitutionality of such sampling. As a result,
the challenges that will inevitably be brought to many of the arrestee DNA
sampling statutes mentioned above will likely present greater challenges to
courts. The next Part of this Note provides an overview of Fourth
Amendment case law relevant to these statutes and examines the challenges
that have been brought to DNA collection statutes by convicted and arrested
persons.
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES
Legal challenges to the use of DNA databases mounted during the
1990s. Challenges have been brought under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause,
as well as on grounds of separation of powers.47 The most common and
46 Gordon Thomas Honeywell Governmental Affairs, 2007 DNA Database
Expansion Legislation (2007), available at http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/
2007DNAExpansionLegislation.pdf and http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/
2008DNAExpansionLegislation.pdf.
47 See Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding
the Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127, 146-51 (2001).
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widely discussed grounds for challenging mandatory DNA sampling,
however, have come under the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures. To understand these challenges, a brief
overview of relevant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is helpful. With this
basis, it can be seen that two approaches to the justification of these statutes
have emerged: the general "totality of the circumstances" approach and the
"special needs" approach.
A. A Brief Overview of Relevant Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Fourth Amendments provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.48
The modem approach to the prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures has been laid out in Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz v. United
States.49 According to Justice Harlan, a search occurs if a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched and that expectation
is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.50 Of particular
importance here, the Supreme Court has held that taking and testing blood
constitutes two separate searches, both of which implicate an individual's
expectation of privacy.51 With respect to the taking of blood, the Court has
held that it is a "'severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal
security' that is subject to constitutional scrutiny.,'52 While the Supreme
Court has not specifically addressed the constitutionality of taking a DNA
sample from a person through a mouth swab or blood sample, a few previous
cases give guidance. In particular, in Schmerber v. California,53 the Court
held that taking a blood sample was an intrusion into the body and required
48 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
49 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Katz involved an electronic listening
device attached to the outside of a phone booth. In addition to the rule laid out in Justice
Harlan's concurrence, the case is remembered for the now famous statement that "the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Id. at 351. This phrase takes on new
relevance with the advent of the many forms of DNA collection statutes at issue here.
50 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
51 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989).
52 Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291,295 (1973) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-
25 (1968)).
53 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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"a clear indication that in fact such [suspected] evidence will be found., 54
The heightened probable cause requirement of Schmerber was reiterated in
1985 in Winston v. Lee,5' in which the Court held, regarding the involuntary
extraction of a bullet out of a suspect's body, "when the State seeks to
intrude upon an area in which our society recognizes a significantly
heightened privacy interest, a more substantial justification is required to
make the search 'reasonable."' ' 5
6
In addition to the extraction of biological samples, the analysis of that
sample is also a search under the Fourth Amendment.57 In Skinner, the "host
of private medical facts about an employee, including whether he or she is
epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic," that would be revealed in an analysis of a
urine sample made it a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.5" Analysis
of urine samples was again held to constitute a search in Ferguson v. City of
Charleston.59 Because the collection of DNA is physically intrusive and its
analysis reveals information far more private than urine, all circuit courts that
have addressed the issue have concluded that forcible DNA collection is a
search under the Fourth Amendment.6 °
Once one has concluded that a search has occurred, it must be supported
by probable cause, which is determined by asking whether a specific item
subject to seizure will be found in a particular area based on well-supported
facts and circumstances within an officer's personal knowledge.6' The
modem test for determining probable cause has been set out by the Supreme
Court in Illinois v. Gates.62 Under Gates, probable cause is to be determined
54 Id. at 770.
55 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
56 Id. at 767.
57 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616.
58 Id. at 617. As mentioned above, DNA holds the ability to tell far more about an
individual than mere urinalysis. Propensities for disease, phenotypic details such as hair
color and eye color, and perhaps even behavioral characteristics can be identified through
the examination of an individual's DNA. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
59 532 U.S. 67, 76 (2001).
60 Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Nicholas v. Goord, 430
F.3d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir.
2005); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1277 (1 1th Cir. 2005); Groceman v. U.S. Dep't
of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675,
676-77 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 821 (9th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003); Jones v. Murray, 962
F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992).
61 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
62 462 U.S. 213 (1983). A number of states still apply the two-prong test set out in
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964), that was replaced by Gates, however. This
test asks whether the information said to constitute probable cause comes from an
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by the "totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed
probable cause determinations. 63 In this analysis, one must consider the
basis of knowledge of the person supplying the information and whether that
information itself is trustworthy, among other factors, but inadequacies in
one may be made up for by additional indicia of reliability in the other.
64
Thus, there are no hard and fast requirements in the determination of
probable cause.65
The most relevant exception to these circumstances is the "special needs"
test first announced in New Jersey v. TL. 0.66 In this context, a search may be
conducted without a warrant or probable cause-or in some circumstances
even reasonable suspicion--due to "special needs, beyond the normal need
for law enforcement.'6 7 Examples of situations in which this exception
applies are school searches, 68 searches of public employees 69 and
probationers,70 and certain instances of drug testing. 71 The exception does
have limits, however. In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,72 the Court
disapproved of a narcotics interdiction checkpoint set up as a roadblock. The
Court distinguished this type of suspicionless search from one approved in
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,73 which involved sobriety
interdiction checkpoints, on the grounds that Sitz did not have a primary
purpose of "detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.,
74
individual with a reliable basis of knowledge and whether the information itself is
reliable. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114. See State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 321-22 (Alaska
1985); Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 556-57 (Mass. 1985); State v.
Cordova, 784 P.2d 30, 33 (N.M. 1989); People v. Griminger, 524 N.E.2d 409, 410 (N.Y.
1988); State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 138-39 (Wash. 1984).
63 462 U.S. at 238.
64 Id. at 230.
65 As a result, the totality of the circumstances approach has been criticized for
setting too low of a standard for police conduct. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth
Amendment Today: A Bicentennial Appraisal, 32 VILL. L. REv. 1061, 1065-70 (1987).
66 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
67 Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
68 Id.
69 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987).
70 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987).
71 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (public
employees); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 664 (1989)
(same); Vemonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995) (public school
students).
72 531 U.S. 32, 40-42 (2000).
73 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990).
74 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38.
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This distinction was further developed in City of Charleston v. Ferguson,
in which procedures used by a hospital, in conjunction with police, to
identify expectant mothers who had used drugs were declared to be in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 75 Maternity patients were required to
submit to a urinalysis test, and if the tests came back positive for drugs, they
were given to police for prosecution.76 The Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Stevens, struck the program down because:
While the ultimate goal of the program may well have been to get the
women in question into substance abuse treatment and off of drugs, the
immediate objective of the searches was to generate evidence for law
enforcement purposes in order to reach that goal. The threat of law
enforcement may ultimately have been intended as a means to an end, but
the direct and primary purpose of MUSC's policy was to ensure the use of
those means. In our opinion, this distinction is critical. 77
Thus, the "special needs" exception cannot justify police actions taken for
"general law enforcement" purposes. The Court has not, however, discussed
precisely how a primary purpose of detecting evidence of "ordinary criminal
wrongdoing" should be found in light of other alleged primary purposes.
Additionally, that there is an impermissible purpose at all seems to conflict
with the Court's general distaste for inquiring into the subjective intent of
police officers, as well.78 As a result, while the "special needs" exception to
the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment is
arguably unavailable to justify DNA collection statutes in light of the
statements made in Edmond and Ferguson, the open-ended nature of the
doctrine does not make this conclusively the case. The circuit courts
considering such statutes are good examples of this debate.
75 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001).
76 Id. at 72-73.
77 Id. at 82-84 (citations omitted).
78 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996). It has been suggested
that the Court's refusal to inquire into the subjective intent of police officers has led to
increased distrust of the police, particularly among groups of African-Americans. See
Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 340 (1998)
(arguing that the Court should take into account the potential racial impact of its rulings).
Indeed, some scholars have noted that Whren itself was decided on grounds improperly
and unnaturally detached from the racial aspects of the case. Anthony C. Thompson,
Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 956,
1012 (1999). That said, the fact that Whren was a unanimous decision does suggest that
the stark split made in Edmond and Ferguson will at some point be addressed. Perhaps
the Court's openness to subjective intent inquiries in the context of "special needs"
searches is a reaction to the perceived troubles brought by an approach to the Fourth
Amendment that completely ignores subjective intent.
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B. Two Approaches Emerge for DNA Collection Statutes: "Special
Needs" and the "Totality of the Circumstances "
In addition to the "special needs" exception, another approach to DNA
collection statutes is to apply the standard "totality of the circumstances"
rule, where a court looks for reasons why the particular individual or class of
individuals affected simply does not have an expectation of privacy sufficient
to outweigh the government interest in collecting the DNA and thereby
warrant Fourth Amendment protection. As it happens, these are the two main
ways in which courts have upheld DNA collection statutes against Fourth
Amendment attacks. While a number of Circuit Courts have issued opinions
along these lines,79 the rationales and the differences between them can be
best understood by evaluating three key opinions: United States v. Kincade8°
from the Ninth Circuit, Nicholas v. Goord8 from the Second Circuit, and
United States v. Stewart8 2 from the District of Massachusetts. Several cases
considering arrestee DNA collection statutes are then worth discussing.
1. Kincade, Goord, and Stewart: Contrasting Approaches to DNA
Sampling of Convicted Persons
At the heart of the debate over how to analyze DNA database statutes lie
questions over the role that individualized suspicion is to play in police
investigations and the difficulty of finding solid ground in the midst of what
some have called a slippery slope towards the evisceration of the Fourth
Amendment.83 These two questions are implicated by DNA database statutes
by virtue of the fact that DNA collection and its retention in databases can be
enormously helpful in investigating future crimes, but the degree to which it
actually is helpful is dependent on the inclusion in the database of as many
people as possible. Thus, the incentive to include is not necessarily satiated
by voluntary donation or mandatory donation from those whom we
reasonably suspect of wrongdoing, but can extend to the forcible collection
from those whom we do not suspect of committing a crime. One main reason
for this is that many of those crimes we seek to aid with databases are those
that have not yet been committed-the DNA is sought for the purpose of
79 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
80 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
81 430 F.3d 652 (2d Cir. 2005).
82 468 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D. Mass. 2007), rev'd, 532 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2008).
83 See, e.g., Kathryn Zunno, Comment, United States v. Kincade and the
Constitutionality of the Federal DNA Act: Why We'll Need a New Pair of Genes to Wear
Down the Slippery Slope, 79 ST. JOHN's. L. REv. 769 (2005).
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having it on file in case the donor commits a crime in the future. 4 Among the
most notable cases struggling with the role of individual suspicion and the
limits of what actions are permitted in the absence of individual suspicion is
that of United States v. Kincade,8 5 decided en banc by the Ninth Circuit in
2004.
"On July 20, 1993, driven by escalating personal and financial troubles,
decorated Navy seaman Thomas Cameron Kincade robbed a bank using a
firearm in violation of [federal law]. He soon pleaded guilty ... and was
sentenced to 97 months' imprisonment, followed by three years' supervised
release. 8 6 His release was conditioned upon compliance with certain
requirements, including that of following the commands of his probation
officer, but he violated those requirements on a number of occasions by
testing positive for cocaine.8 7 After making demonstrable improvements in
his life, Kincade was asked to submit to a DNA test by his probation officer
on March 25, 2002, pursuant to the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act
of 2000.8 Kincade refused and his probation officer ultimately informed the
District Court of his refusal.8 9 After the District Court rejected Kincade's
challenge that the DNA Backlog Act violated his Fourth Amendment rights,
the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court and took the extraordinary step
of granting a rehearing en banc.90 On August 18, 2004, the eleven-member
en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit rejected Kincade's contention, but did so
without a majority rationale due to a 5-1-5 split, with five different
opinions.91
Writing for the five judge plurality, Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain applied
the traditional "totality of the circumstances" test to the Act, but not without
considering the alternative taken by many other courts: the "special needs"
exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement, first enunciated in
Justice Blackmun's concurrence in New Jersey v. T.L.0. to permit searches
in a school because of "special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement .... ,92 Judge O'Scannlain discussed the relationship of the
"special needs" exception to law enforcement activities, noting that,
84 See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
85 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) [hereinafter Kincade en banc].
86 Id. at 820.
87 Id.
88 DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546, 114 Stat.
2726 (2000).
89 Kincade en banc, 379 F.3d at 820-21.
90 United States v. Kincade, 354 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Kincade 11.
91 See Kincade en banc, 379 F.3d 813.
92 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985).
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"[a]lmost as soon as the 'special needs' rationale was articulated ... the
Court applied special needs analysis in what seemed-at least on the
surface-to be a clear law enforcement context.,
9 3
Ultimately, however, Judge O'Scannlain opted not to apply special needs
analysis.94 Instead, the plurality opted to follow a 1995 precedent of the
Ninth Circuit that upheld a state DNA collection statute under the traditional
"totality of the circumstances" approach, which calls for a person's
expectation of privacy to be balanced against the government's interest in
taking the contested action. 95
Having thus selected the "totality of the circumstances" approach, the
plurality began its analysis by noting that neither Edmond nor Ferguson
condemned suspicionless searches outside the context of "special needs" and
that, indeed, the distinction drawn in Ferguson between suspicionless
searches of conditional releasees and the general public in the context of
"special needs" analysis provided a "jurisprudentially sound analytic
division" for the "totality of the circumstances" approach.96 As for Kincade's
privacy interest, the plurality found it to be low, given the fact that blood
tests are very common97 and that, because he was a convicted felon on
supervised release, the DNA profile provided identification information no
more personal than other information requested for the same offense.98
In contrast, the plurality found the government interest in collecting the
DNA samples to be "undeniably compelling." 99 The need to discourage or
deter recidivism is mentioned as a strong interest on a number of
occasions.100 Additionally, linking these releases to crimes committed while
they are at large, ensuring that they adhere to the requirements of release, and
"bring[ing] closure to countless victims of crime who long have languished
in the knowledge that perpetrators remain at large" were found to constitute a
"monumental" interest. 10
93 Kincade en banc, 379 F.3d at 824.
9 4 1d. at 831-32.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 832.
97 Id. at 836.
98 Id. at 837.
99 Kincade en banc, 379 F.3d at 838.
100 Id. at 833, 839. This description of the DNA Act's purpose has been criticized.
See Zunno, supra note 83, at 811. The author of this Comment argues that the legislative
and executive branches clearly intended the primary purpose of the Act to be that of
solving past and future crimes, given the statements made in the legislative history and by
the Department of Justice. Id. at 811-14.
101 Kincade en banc, 379 F.3d at 838-39.
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The sixth, and crucial, vote in favor of upholding the Act came from
Judge Ronald Gould. Judge Gould opted for the "special needs" approach
due to what he felt was an important rule to be elucidated from Ferguson and
Griffin v. Wisconsin,'°2 which allowed warrantless searches of state
parolees, 10 3 stating that "[t]he deterrent felt by a person on supervised release
who must participate in the DNA program and the CODIS database serves
the special needs of a supervised release system."' 4 Judge Gould
distinguished this from the "general law enforcement" purpose ruled
impermissible in Ferguson on the grounds that
the Supreme Court's reluctance to apply special needs analysis to endorse
warrantless searches aimed at general law enforcement cautions against
applying this doctrine to general law enforcement aimed at past crime. It
does not mean that special needs analysis cannot be applied to DNA
collection from those on supervised release with the purposes to deter future
crime .... 105
The opinion then faults the dissent for focusing too much on facts that are not
present in this case 10 6 and seeks to emphasize that this "special needs"
approval does not focus on anyone other than a convicted felon on
supervised release: "What we do not have before us is a petitioner who has
fully paid his or her debt to society... and who has left the penal system.'
0 7
This, then, along with the surrounding language, seems to indicate that a case
with slightly different facts-say, a person who has completed his or her
term of supervised release seeking to expunge the record from CODIS-may
well succeed in the eyes of Judge Gould.
Judge Stephen Reinhardt responded with a blistering dissent, joined by
three other judges. Striking at the heart of the plurality's claim that searches
conducted without individualized suspicion could be permissible outside the
"special needs" context, Judge Reinhardt emphasized that, "[n]ever has the
Court approved of a search like the one we confront today: a programmatic
search designed to produce and maintain evidence relating to ordinary
102 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
103 Kincade en banc, 379 F.3d at 840.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 841 n.2 ("Because circumstances that arise when a releasee has complete
supervised release and is no longer in the criminal justice system are not now before us,
we cannot definitively discuss the legality of the DNA Act beyond its immediate
application to Kincade in the case now presented."). This statement, contained in the
opinion that ultimately upheld the Act, seems to undercut the precedential value of
Kincade for cases involving arrestee statutes, as will be discussed below in Part IV.
107 Id. at 841.
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criminal wrongdoing .... 08 After noting the "opaque" and "malleable"
nature of the plurality's "totality of the circumstances" approach 09 and a
lengthy discussion of the history and expansion of DNA databases,"10 Judge
Reinhardt focused his criticism on the abandonment of the principle
requiring individual suspicion as a basic tenet of a reasonable Fourth
Amendment search."' As for the "special needs" doctrine, Judge Reinhardt
felt that it did supply the proper mode of analysis,1 2 but disagreed with
Judge Gould's application, stating, "[a]lthough the 'general interest in law
enforcement' does not refer to every law enforcement objective ... valid
special needs, as the Court most recently explained in [Illinois v.] Lidster,13
108 Id. at 843. Judge Reinhardt noted experiences from our recent history showing
the dangers of unrestrained programmatic searches conducted without any individualized
suspicion, including "J. Edgar Hoover terroriz[ing] leaders of the civil rights movement
by exploiting the information he collected in his files," as well as "[o]ur government's
surveillance and shameful harassment of suspected communists and alleged communist-
sympathizers," which resulted from centralized information often collected pursuant to
violations of the Fourth Amendment, plus the Palmer Raids and Japanese Internment
Camps of World War II. Id. An additional problem is the sheer size of the bureaucracy
created by DNA databases, which may lead to inaccuracies or abuse. Id. In such a
bureaucracy, human error can lead to mistakes with grave consequences. Robert A. Perry,
Op-Ed., DNA Database Is Not an Exact Science, ALBANY TIMES-UNION, June 18, 2007,
available at http://www.nyclu.org/node/1307. Perry, who is legislative director of the
New York Civil Liberties Union, notes that New York's Commission of Investigation
found that sufficient qualified analysts were lacking in the system and that an enormous
backlog of samples needed to be analyzed may require outsourcing. Id.
109 Kincade en banc, 379 F.3d at 844.
110 Id. at 845-51. In particular, Judge Reinhardt noted the sheer breadth of offenses
that qualify one for forcible DNA collection, which includes "tearing apart a $1 bill in
protest against a perceived arbitrary governmental policy," cutting the buoy rope of a
boat belonging to another, and "interference with or intimidation of federal meat, poultry,
or poultry products inspectors," among others. Id. at 846-47 (citations omitted).
111 Id. at 852. Both ancient and recent sources are cited in support of this. The
Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 provided, "[tihat general warrants, whereby any
officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of
a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offence is not
particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought
not to be granted." Id. The Supreme Court recently emphasized the importance of
individualized suspicion in upholding Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), which ruled
unconstitutional requirements to provide identification to police officers without
reasonable suspicion. Kincade en banc, 379 F.3d at 853 n.10 (citing Hiibel v. Sixth
Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004)).
112 Kincade en banc, 379 F.3d at 863.
113 540 U.S. 419 (2004). Lidster involved a road checkpoint in which the police
sought information from individuals about a fatal hit-and-run that had occurred at that
location a week prior. The Court in Lidster distinguished Edmond on the grounds that,
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may not include efforts to obtain information related to possible crimes that




The second dissent, authored by Judge Alex Kozinski, noted that if the
purpose of taking DNA samples to help solve crimes later is a justifiable way
of getting around the Fourth Amendment, then a law forcing those who have
paid their debts to society, or indeed, who had never been in debt to society,
could be legitimized under the same rationale." 5 Judge Kozinski then sought
to refocus the Fourth Amendment issue present in this case away from the
physically intrusive nature of the taking of the blood sample and onto the
"seizure of the DNA fingerprint and its inclusion in a searchable
database."' 1' 6 Rejecting the plurality and Judge Gould's concern that
consideration should be limited to the facts at hand, Judge Kozinski
presciently argued that the expansion of DNA database laws is a virtual
certainty and that this requires checks be set in place soon, since "[n]ot only
do [Fourth Amendment opinions] reflect today's values by giving effect to
people's reasonable expectations of privacy, they also shape future values by
changing our experience and altering what we come to expect from our
government.,,17 In the end, Judge Kozinski felt that, applying the plurality's
test, "it's hard to see how we can keep the database from expanding to
include everybody.... I'm hard pressed to see how [the plurality's test]




Thus, a majority of the panel agreed that the "special needs" doctrine
should be applied, but a different majority agreed on the constitutionality of
the Act, with resulting opinions that stand in contrast to another notable-
and unanimous--opinion from the Second Circuit.
"[t]he stop's primary law enforcement purpose was not to determine whether a vehicle's
occupants were committing a crime, but to ask vehicle occupants, as members of the
public, for their help in providing information about a crime in all likelihood committed
by others." Id. at 423. But could the familial similarities in DNA, see supra note 17 and
accompanying text, justify asking one individual for DNA not for the information it may
provide about that person's involvement in crime, but rather on any relatives'
involvement in crime? Common sense seems to suggest that the answer is "no," but the
language itself does not seem to foreclose this possibility.
114 Kincade en banc, 379 F.3d at 854.
115 Id. at 872. Judge Kozinski succinctly summarized the plurality's rationale as
follows: "We have a pretty good idea that people who have committed crimes in the past
are more likely than others to commit crimes in the future. It is thus very, very, very
useful for us to get their DNA fingerprints now so we can use them later to investigate
crimes." Id.
116 Id. at 873.
1]8Id. at 872.
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In Nicholas v. Goord,"9 convicted felons challenged New York's statute
requiring the taking of DNA samples from certain classes of convicted felons
in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.120 Judge John M. Walker was confronted
with the same question as the Kincade court: whether to apply the traditional
"totality of the circumstances" approach or the "special needs" doctrine. The
majority rejected the approach taken by many of the courts opting for the
"totality of the circumstances" test, which have cited United States v.
Knights'2' as support for this approach to DNA sampling statutes. In Knights,
the Supreme Court upheld the search of a probationer under the "totality of
the circumstances" approach, but, Judge Walker argues, it did not do so to
indicate that all searches of a probationer should be considered regardless of
whether individualized suspicion exists. Indeed, "we think it telling that
the Court emphasized, from the very first paragraph of its opinion, that the
search of Knights's apartment was 'supported by reasonable suspicion.' "
23
With this, the majority opted for the "special needs" approach, but
departed from the Kincade opinion yet again in doing so. While Judge Gould
found the "special need" in Kincade to be that of administering the
supervisory release program,124 this option was not available to Judge Walker
because of the simple fact that the plaintiffs here had been forced to give
their samples while still in prison. Instead, the majority found the primary
purpose of the statute to be "to create a DNA database to assist in solving
crimes should the investigation of such crimes permit resort to DNA testing
of evidence. 125 Support for this was said to come from the distinction in
Lidster approving of "special needs" searches when done for the purpose of
"information seeking" as opposed to those which are simply looking for
119 430 F.3d 652 (2d Cir. 2005).
120 Id. at 655-56. In particular, the plaintiffs sought to have their DNA expunged
from New York's database-against the statute's requirement that this only be done if a
conviction is reversed or a pardon is granted-and money damages. Id. at 656. It is also
worth noting that although the plaintiffs' DNA was taken pursuant to a blood sample, the
statute was amended in 1999 to allow sampling from methods other than blood sampling
and the state maintained that their "current normal practice" is to take DNA through a
swab of the inside of an individual's cheek. Id. at 656 n.5. The court in Goord stated that
its analysis was to be confined to taking DNA through blood sample, though it cited
Skinner for the proposition that "even less intrusive measures ... such as cheek swabs,
can constitute a search," since the analysis of the sample also implicates privacy interests.
Id. (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives 'Ass 'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)).
121 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
122 Goord, 430 F.3d at 665.
123 Id. (citation omitted).
124 See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
125 Goord, 430 F.3d at 668.
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evidence of "ordinary criminal wrongdoing.' 26 Thus, Judge Walker drew a
distinction in the "special needs" doctrine within the context of law
enforcement. From here, Judge Walker characterized the prisoners' privacy
interests as low due to the fact that the drawing of blood was minimally
intrusive and because the statute, as written, does not pose a threat of
exposing more personal information.127 The end result is the same as in
Kincade: New York's statute requiring DNA sampling from prisoners was
upheld.
The end result was not the same in a case decided on January 8, 2007 in
the District of Massachusetts. In United States v. Stewart, 28 a probationer
sought to prevent the United States Probation Department from obtaining a
DNA sample pursuant to the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of
2000. After stating the standard understanding of the relevant Fourth
Amendment case law, the court began to examine the statute under the
general "totality of the circumstances" balancing test with a very common
sense statement: "[t]he outcome of the balancing is largely determined by
how the two weights in the balance are characterized.', 129 As for the
governmental interest, Judge William G. Young noted three possibilities
raised by previous cases involving probationers and DNA collection statutes:
"a general supervisory interest in probationers[], prevention of recidivism
through deterrence[], and the development and maintenance of a DNA
database to assist in the solving of past and prospective crimes[]"'' 30
From here, Judge Young noted the traditional importance of the
individualized suspicion requirement, but drew an analogy from the "special
needs" context to the probationer context to explain why, even under the
general "totality of the circumstances" test, individualized suspicion may be
less of a requirement.' 31 "In the context of a search of persons released yet
under continuing supervision, the Supreme Court has relaxed the traditional
safeguards.' 32 That said, the Court found the "general supervisory interest in
probationers" insufficient because, unlike previous cases involving
12 6 Id.
127 Id. at 670.
128 468 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D. Mass. 2007).
129/a. at 269.
130Id. at 269-70 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876 (1987) (general
supervisory interest); see also United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 838-39 (9th Cir.
2004) (prevention of recidivism through deterrence); Goord, 430 F.3d at 668 (use of
DNA database).
131 Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 270-71.
132 Id. at 271 (citing Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006)) (emphasis added).
In Samson, the Court upheld warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees because of
the government's interest in preventing a return to crime. 547 U.S. at 854.
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probationers, "a probationer cannot take any action to thwart or conceal the
information contained in his DNA" and the DNA does not show wrongdoing
immediately, it must be taken back to a laboratory and analyzed. 33 Thus,
"[t]here is no reason why a probation officer who suspects ongoing criminal
activity could not take the reasonable time to secure a warrant for DNA
collection without fear that the information he seeks would be destroyed or
concealed.'
134
Judge Young then rejected the second governmental interest: prevention
of recidivism through deterrence. Specifically, if the theory behind this
interest is that individuals who have given their DNA will take this fact into
account when contemplating a future crime because they will likely leave
DNA behind during its commission, Judge Young found it "speculative at
best" and too reliant on unsupportable inferences. 135 This is especially
evident given the crime Stewart was charged with: unlawfully diverting
Social Security benefits, in which DNA plays no role in its investigation or
prosecution.
36
Lastly, Judge Young found the third governmental interest insufficient as
well. While building a large, federal database may be a very powerful tool in
solving crime, it should not be given too much weight when samples are
sought through suspicionless searches. 37 It is true, Judge Young noted, that
Stewart's status as a probationer diminishes his expectation of privacy, but,
"[t]he government cannot ... also use this probationary status to increase the
importance of the governmental purpose served by the search."' 38
As for Stewart's expectation of privacy, his status as a probationer
certainly meant that he had fewer liberties than fully free individuals, but
Judge Young distinguished this case from Goord and others on the grounds
that Stewart had never served any jail time. 139 The lack of jail time and the
133 Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 272.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. Indeed, as Judge Reinhardt noted in Kincade, the law requires DNA
collection for, among other things, intimidation of a federal poultry inspection officer.
See supra note 110 and accompanying text. One can imagine such intimidation occurring
through means guaranteeing that the perpetrator would leave behind no DNA, thus
making the previous inclusion of that person's DNA in a database no deterrent to groups
targeted by this law, such as PETA. See generally, R. Emmett Tyrrell, Tyrrell: Animal
Rights Nonsense, CNN.CoM, April 20, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/
04/20/tyrrell.peta/index.html.
137 Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 273.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 275 ("On the punishment continuum.., incarceration places the prisoner
at the lowest degree of any expectation of privacy. This diminished expectation of
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suspicionless and warrantless nature of the search undermine the notion that
physical intrusiveness can be significantly minimized. 140 Additionally, the
chemical analysis of the sample is an even greater intrusion because it
contains information so personal and revealing. 14' The court discussed this
aspect of the balancing test in much greater detail.
The court seemed conflicted by statements made by the Supreme Court
indicating that probationers have a reduced expectation of privacy yet still
retain some rights. 14 2 Additionally, the Court has noted that probationers
have greater rights than prisoners, parolees, and those on supervised
release. 143 Judge Young wondered, if there are any rights held by
probationers, it is hard to see what they could be if they are not implicated in
this case. 144 Further, Judge Young felt that in a world in which more and
more private information is becoming exposed to the public, thereby
reducing the expectations of privacy relevant to Fourth Amendment
inquiries, some resistance was necessary. 145 This case is a perfect example,
because "[h]ere, the segment of society that the government seeks to search
is in no way marginal."' 146 Allowing the government to take DNA samples
from probationers would, Judge Young felt, lead our country further down
the slippery slope towards abuse of the information contained in those
samples. 47 For example, the court noted that while Social Security numbers
were first intended to aid the disbursement of retirement benefits, they have
subsequently come to serve as a universal identification number.148 In
addition, census records were used to help fill Japanese Internment Camps
during World War 11.149 And lastly,
privacy arises from having no Fourth Amendment rights in their prison cells, and from
the continual need 'to expose their body cavities for visual inspection as a part of a strip
search conducted after every contact visit with a person from outside the
institution .... "') (internal citations omitted).
140 Id. at 277.
141 Id. at 277-78 (citing Kincade en banc, 379 F.3d at 849-850 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
142 Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 278.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 278-79.
146Id. at 279 ("[O]ne out of every forty-two Americans-over seven million
persons-are either in prison, on parole, or on probation.... In light of such statistics, the
scope and effect of such a search regime is staggering.") (citations omitted).
147 Id. at 279-80.
148 Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 280.
149 Id.; see also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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two National Security Agency intelligence collection programs... operated
during the Cold War, began with the narrow purpose of exploiting foreign
intelligence for national security purposes. Soon, both programs expanded
past this initial purpose and turned the awesome power of its collection
capabilities and data-mining against American citizens and domestic
terminals. 
150
As a result, the court believed that it was necessary to safeguard against the
slippery slope and hold the Act unconstitutional.'
Thus, the court in Stewart agreed with the Kincade plurality that the
"totality of the circumstances" approach should be employed, but disagreed
sharply as to its application. The different discussions and opinions stated in
Kincade, Goord, and Stewart regarding the "totality of the circumstances"
and "special needs" tests cannot always neatly be applied in the context of
arrestee DNA collection statutes, however, as the following cases show.
2. New Horizons: Challenges to Statutes Requiring DNA from
Arrestees
The expansion of DNA database laws to cover arrestees poses new
challenges to the rationales employed in the cases discussed above. As a
result, it has been questioned whether such arrestee statutes would be able to
survive the challenges that inevitably emerge. 152 Alternative exceptions to the
warrant and probable cause requirements have also been suggested. 153 As the
150 468 F. Supp. 2d at 280. Programs such as this may not have been left behind in
the Cold War. Federal authorities are planning a "one-stop shop" for law enforcement
authorities seeking information related to terrorism prevention comprised of links formed
through a Justice Department network called National Data Exchange. Robert O'Harrow,
Jr. and Ellen Nakashima, National Dragnet is a Click Away, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2008,
at Al; see also Ellen Nakashima, FBI Prepares Vast Database of Biometrics, WASH.
POST, Dec. 22, 2007, at Al.
151 Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d.at 281-82, rev'd, 532 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2008).
152 See Maclin, supra note 19. One of the lawyers who litigated Ferguson before the
Supreme Court argues that courts applying the "special needs" exception to DNA
collection statutes have done more harm to the Fourth Amendment than good. Julie
Rikelman, Justifying Forcible DNA Testing Schemes Under the Special Needs Exception
to the Fourth Amendment: A Dangerous Precedent, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 41, 75-76
(2007).
153 David H. Kaye, Who Needs Special Needs? On the Constitutionality of
Collecting DNA and Other Biometric Data from Arrestees, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 188,
192-93 (2006) (suggesting a "biometric identification" exception to the warrant
requirement); Paul M. Monteloni, Note, DNA Databases, Universality, and the Fourth
Amendment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 247, 247 (2007) (urging a "universality exception" to the
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shift towards inclusion of arrestees into DNA database statutes becomes
more well known, particularly with the federal DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005,
it is virtually certain that legal challenges will be brought. The first of these
have just started to emerge, with the result that one statute has been struck
down by a Minnesota appellate court while another has been upheld by the
Virginia Supreme Court. These cases deserve some attention.
The first such case was delivered on October 10, 2006, by the Minnesota
Court of Appeals. That case, In re Welfare of C. T.L., Juvenile,154 involved a
juvenile who had been charged with fifth-degree assault and aiding and
abetting first-degree aggravated robbery. 155 Upon an attempt by the state to
obtain an order from the trial court requiring the defendant to provide a DNA
sample, the defendant sought an order finding that the statute requiring these
samples violated the Fourth Amendment and the Minnesota Constitution. 5 6
Thus, the Minnesota Court of Appeals was faced squarely with a question
that had never been presented in any of the cases upholding DNA databases:
"Do the portions of [the Minnesota statute] that direct law-enforcement
personnel to take a biological specimen from a person who has been charged
with an offense, but not convicted, violate the Fourth Amendment ... ?A57
The court answered in the affirmative.
The court began by noting that the statute in question applies not only to
juveniles, but to all persons arrested for the enumerated offenses, and that
expungement of the records is required if no conviction results. 58 From here,
the court acknowledged the implications of the physically intrusive nature of
the method to obtain the DNA sample. 59 While the court did not indicate
whether it was by buccal swab or blood sample, it cited Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass n, 6 0 for the proposition that "the collection and subsequent
analysis of the requisite biological samples must be deemed Fourth
Amendment searches.' 6' In a further indication that the physical
intrusiveness of the sample would be an important factor in its consideration
of the law, the court discussed, at length, Schmerber v. California,162 which
warrant requirement making a search reasonable if it "is authorized by a statute that truly
applies equally to every member of the population.").
154 722 N.W.2d 484 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
155 Id. at 486.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 488.
159 Id. at 488-89.
160 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
161 C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d at 488 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618).
162 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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involved the unconsented taking of a blood sample from a person who had
recently been in an automobile collision for the purpose of determining
whether the person had been intoxicated at the time of the crash.1
63
The purpose of this discussion was to reject one argument that had been
made to justify the taking of the DNA sample: that the finding by a judge that
probable cause existed to arrest the defendant was sufficient to justify the
sampling. Not so, said the court, because "just as in Schmerber ... a
determination of probable cause to support a criminal charge, even if it is
made by a judge, is not sufficient to permit a biological specimen to be taken
from the person charged without a warrant."'' 64
The court then rejected the state's second argument: that the "totality of
the circumstances" approach adopted by other courts in the context of
convicted felons applies with equal force in the context of arrestees. The
court distinguished these cases on the grounds that, in the course of the
balancing test conducted by the other courts, the reduced expectation of
privacy of convicted persons is outweighed by the state's interest in
collecting DNA samples.1 65 Because arrestees have not yet been convicted of
the crime for which they have been arrested, "the reduced expectation of
privacy that was present in the cases the state cites is not present here.' 66
That the expectation of privacy of arrestees has not been reduced by arrest is
further evidenced, the court claimed, by the fact that the statute mandates the
DNA records be expunged if no conviction results from the arrest. 67 What is
more, the court explained:
[B]ecause a person who has been charged is presumed innocent until proved
guilty, we see no basis for concluding that before being convicted, a
charged person's privacy expectation is different from the privacy
expectation of a person who was charged but the charge was dismissed or
the person was found not guilty.168
163 C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d at 488-89. The Minnesota Court noted that the reason the
blood sample could be obtained in Schmerber was not simply because there was likely
alcohol in the blood, but because the alcohol could disappear, leaving no evidence of the
suspected crime. Id. at 490. Thus, by way of analogy to DNA, the court seems to say that
the fact that we know DNA contains information that will identify the individual should
not be sufficient, on its own, to support a finding of probable cause-there must be more.
164Id. at 490.
165 Id. at 491.
166 Id.
167 Id. This reasoning is especially true when one considers the fact, discussed
further in Part IV, that laws requiring arrestees to submit to DNA sampling really only
target individuals who are not guilty of the crime for which they have been arrested.
168 Id. at 491-92.
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Thus, the statute was held unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and
the Minnesota Constitution. 69 It is not, however, the only view that has been
taken in regards to arrestee DNA sampling statutes.
On September 14, 2007, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld Virginia's
arrestee sampling statute in an opinion markedly different from that of the
Minnesota Court of Appeals. 170 In Anderson v. Commonwealth, Angel
Anderson was indicted in 2004 for allegedly raping, sodomizing, and robbing
Laura Berry on July 23, 1991.17' He was connected to this crime only after
being arrested in 2003 on unrelated charges of rape and sodomy and being
forced, pursuant to Virginia's arrestee DNA sampling statute, 172 to submit to
a buccal swab for the purpose of extracting and analyzing his DNA.1 73 In
response, Anderson argued that the DNA sample was an unconstitutional
search under the Fourth Amendment. 1
74
The Virginia Supreme Court characterized the swab as "minimally
intrusive" and therefore spent essentially none of the opinion discussing the
concerns of physical intrusiveness that had been quite apparent to the
Minnesota Court of Appeals, and cited Skinner only in passing to
recharacterize Anderson's seizure claim as that of a search. 175 Instead, the
critical issue for the court was the degree to which DNA profiles are
analogous to fingerprinting, on the ground that, "[w]hen a suspect is arrested
upon probable cause, his identification becomes a matter of legitimate state
interest and he can hardly claim privacy in it.' 7 6 The court "accept[ed] thisproposition because the identification of suspects is relevant not only to
169 C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d at 492. Members of the Minnesota Bar were divided on
whether this decision was a victory for the public or a loss. Michelle Lore, DNA Sample
Decision in MN Gets a Mixed Reaction from Bar, MINN. LAW., Oct. 23, 2006, at 3. In
particular, several lawyers felt that the decision relied on outdated case law and a limited
understanding of how advanced technologies are becoming accepted parts of society. Id
at 3, 5. On the other hand, others felt the decision clearly reaffirms the presumption of
innocence and the importance of the probable cause requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. Id.
170 Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 708 (Va. 2007). Virginia's statute
requires that "[e]very person arrested for the commission or attempted commission of a
violent felony as defined in [certain sections of the Va. Code] ... shall have a sample of
his saliva or tissue taken for DNA... analysis to determine identification characteristics
specific to the person." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2:1 (2008).
171 650 S.E.2d at 703, 704.
172 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2:1 (2008).
173 Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 704.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 706 n.2.
176 Id. at 705 (quoting Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992)).
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solving the crime for which the suspect is arrested, but also for maintaining a
permanent record to solve other past and future crimes."'
77
The court then rejected the claim by the defendant that Edmond and
Ferguson condemn the kind of suspicionless search conducted here on the
ground that individualized suspicion is not necessary because the DNA
sampling is a part of "routine booking procedures.' 7 8 The court does not
directly state that the intrusiveness of the search is not relevant in the
consideration of searches conducted as part of "routine booking procedures,"
however, because it employs the same "totality of the circumstances"
balancing test adopted by the Fourth Circuit in upholding a convicted felon
sampling statute, 79 stating, "the minor intrusion caused by the taking of a
[DNA] sample is outweighed by Virginia's interest.., in determining
inmates' 'identification characteristics specific to the person' for improved
law enforcement."'
' 80
Thus, the court specifically attached its rationale to the notion that DNA
sampling through buccal swab is not particularly intrusive, and also that a
DNA profile aids the booking process by providing a more precise method of
identifying and processing a defendant than those used before. As for
individualized suspicion, the court sees the issue as resolved by the fact that
the state has an interest in DNA samples as a more sophisticated form of
fingerprint identification: because the taking of the DNA sample is justified
as a routine booking procedure, no additional finding of probable cause is
required.18 ' As such, its analysis takes a very different approach to arrestee
DNA sampling statutes compared to that of the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
These two opinions are only the first to emerge, however, and they are not
extensive treatises on the subject. Further analysis of arrestee DNA collection
statutes in light of the rationales employed so far is needed.
177 Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 705. As mentioned, however, federal law requires that
state access to the national CODIS database is contingent upon the state having laws
requiring the expungement of DNA samples from individuals arrested but not found
guilty within a certain time period. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Thus,
while the state may keep fingerprints to help solve future crimes, Congress has seen fit to
make a distinction in the case of DNA obtained from arrestees. Id.
178 Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 706.
179 Jones, 962 F.2d at 307.
180 Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 706 (quoting Jones, 962 F.2d at 307).
181 Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 706. The court also addressed individualized suspicion
earlier in the opinion while making the initial connection to fingerprinting. Id. at 705
("Like fingerprinting, the 'Fourth Amendment does not require an additional finding of
individualized suspicion' before a DNA sample can be taken.") (quoting Jones, 962 F.2d
at 306-07).
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IV. STATUTORY ARRESTEE DNA COLLECTION IS UNJUSTIFIABLE
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
From these cases, a number of things are clear: First, with the exception
of the District Court in United States v. Stewart, courts are generally in
agreement that statutes requiring convicted persons to submit to DNA testing
are constitutional, although there are differences as to the rationale. Second,
the recent expansion of state laws to include arrestees has not yet been
evaluated by enough courts to establish any meaningful trend. On the one
hand, the fact that the rationales used for convicted persons statutes are in
such flux may prove to be helpful to courts seeking to mold them to uphold
arrestee statutes. On the other hand, the "totality of the circumstances" and
"special needs" approaches seem to be less suited to arrestee statutes than
they are currently to convicted persons. With this case law and the highly
personal nature of DNA, a number of considerations should be important
when analyzing challenges to statutes requiring the collection of DNA from
arrestees. First, it is important to note certain characteristics of arrestee
collection statutes that make them distinct from statutes requiring DNA
collection from various groups of individuals who have at least been
convicted of a crime. Second, the "totality of the circumstances" approach, as
articulated in the context of DNA collection statutes, does not provide a
wholly satisfactory form of analysis for arrestee collection statutes. Third, the
"special needs" test is similarly in a poor position to justify arrestee
collection statutes, albeit for entirely different reasons.
A. Distinguishing Characteristics of DNA Collection from Arrestees
The single most important characteristic of DNA collection statutes that
require sampling from those merely arrested for certain crimes is that only
individuals who are not guilty of the crime for which they have been arrested
are affected. All arrestees forced to give samples can be divided into two
groups: those who are ultimately found guilty and those who are not. The
state will already get the DNA from the first group pursuant to the existing
statutes in every state requiring convicted persons to submit to DNA testing.
It is the second group that represents the real gain for law enforcement, and
as mentioned, the defining feature of this group is not simply that they are
"innocent until proven guilty," but rather, that they are simply not going to be
found guilty of the crime for which they have been arrested at all. Permitting
the state to pass a law effectively targeting this group for submission to
physically intrusive searches would be a truly unique action.
Beyond this characteristic, however, lies the fact that permitting the
collection of DNA from arrestees would dramatically increase the number of
samples being collected by the government. In 2004, law enforcement
20091
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
authorities made a total of 13,938,071 arrests.' 82 Of these, 586,558 are for
violent felonies. 83 Sexual offenses account for an additional 90 ,9 13 .184 While
the current database holds only about 5.26 million samples,185 there are
already concerns about the potential for human error in analyzing all these
samples. 86 These statistics show just how drastically the rate of DNA
collection would increase if arrestees were included.'87 This factor should be
taken into account by courts considering the government's interest in
collecting DNA. Investigating and prosecuting crimes are thoroughly
dependent on both an effective and efficient law enforcement community.
In addition to these bureaucratic considerations, equality concerns are
also implicated by DNA collection from arrestees, as opposed to convicted
persons. African-Americans currently make up 12.3% of the total population
of 281,421,906,88 however they account for 26.8% of all adult arrests and
27.5% of all juvenile arrests. 189 It has already been argued that these
disparities are the result of racial profiling. 190 Expanding DNA collection to
182 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2004: UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS 280 tbl.29, available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius 04/
personsarrested/table_29.html. This data is collected from the District of Columbia and
the 46 states that submit the information to the FBI voluntarily. Data from the other four
states is reported to the FBI by local law enforcement agencies. Id. at 488 app. I,
available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius04/appendices/appendix_0 1.html.
183 Id. at 280 tbl.29. "Violent crimes" is defined as murder, forcible rape, robbery,
and aggravated assault. Id.
184 Id. "Sexual offenses" does not include forcible rape, which is included in the
category of violent felonies. Id.
185 Fed. Bureau of Investigation, NDIS Statistics, supra note 26.
186 Perry, supra note 108.
187 Indeed, while the United Kingdom is often noted for having the most inclusive
DNA database of any country, see TIMES ONLINE, supra note 11, the smaller size of the
UK reduces some of the pressures that come from bureaucratic control. The current
database holds approximately 3,785,781 samples. UNITED KINGDOM HOME OFFICE, THE
NATIONAL DNA DATABASE ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006, at 29, available at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/DNA-report2005-06.pdf. Thus, the
bureaucratic concerns are not as pressing in the UK.
188 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILES OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS:
2000 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, at 1, available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/cen2000/dpl/2kh00.pdf. Currently, however, the total population is estimated to be
over 300,000,000. U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. and World Population Clocks,
http://www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html (last visited on Feb. 14, 2009).
189 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2004: UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS 298-300 tbl.43, available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/
personsarrested/table_38-43.html.
190 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling
and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REv. 651, 658 (2002) (analyzing
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include arrestees would result in African-Americans being forced to submit
to these suspicionless, physically intrusive searches at a disproportionately
high rate. l9 ' This is an additional factor that should be taken into account by
courts, as these statutes constitute government action that results in intrusions
into the privacy of a specific group far more than others.
Thus, the facts that forcing arrestees to submit to DNA testing really only
targets those that are not guilty of the crime for which they've been arrested,
results in an unmanageable bureaucratic process that is more susceptible to
human error, and exacerbates an already large racial disparity should be
taken into account by courts considering constitutional challenges to such
statutes. These facts add new complications to a doctrinal struggle that is
already unlikely to result in a finding of constitutionality for arrestee DNA
collection statutes under the "totality of the circumstances" approach.
B. Applying the "Totality of the Circumstances " Test to Arrestee DNA
Collection Statutes
Courts applying the "totality of the circumstances" approach in the
context of convicted persons have been forced to confront whether the
requirement of individual suspicion is an insurmountable one. The plurality
in Kincade felt it was not, and the court in Stewart felt it was more of a
strong consideration to be factored in to the expectation of privacy prong of
the "totality of the circumstances" test. In truth, this is likely the legal
consideration that is least affected by the change in factual circumstances
from convicted persons to arrestees.
The Kincade plurality began its discussion of the "totality of the
circumstances" test by noting that Ferguson and Edmond do not explicitly
condemn searches lacking in individualized suspicion that are not also
covered by the "special needs" exception. 192 Judge Reinhardt is similarly
unable to cite any cases directly holding that individual suspicion is required
in all "totality of the circumstances" cases. 193 Thus, it does not seem likely
that if arrestee DNA collection statutes are struck down it will be solely
demographic data collected on stops and arrests along 1-95 in Maryland pursuant to a
1995 Maryland court order and arguing that racial profiling played a role in determining
what cars police officers focused on); Daniel J. Grimm, Note, The Demographics of
Genetic Surveillance: Familial DNA Testing and the Hispanic Community, 107 COLUM.
L. REv. 1164 (2007) (arguing that familial DNA testing will disproportionately impact
the Hispanic community).
191 See JENNY Rus-LOw, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, RAPID DNA
DATABASE EXPANSION AND DISPARATE MINORITY IMPACT, available at http://www.gene-
watch.org/DNADatabases/RushlowReport.pdf.
192 Kincade en banc, 379 F.3d at 832.
193 Id. at 843.
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because they are suspicionless searches. On the other hand, the plurality's
additional justification for lowering the concerns regarding the suspicionless
aspect of DNA collection was the "jurisprudentially sound analytic division"
between conditional releasees and the general public. 94 This reasoning could
mean that in the context of arrestees, individualized suspicion should play
more of a role. After all, if the general public deserves individualized
suspicion, shouldn't members of the general public who get caught up in a
police investigation still have that protection? Remember, arrestee statutes
primarily impact those members of the general public who are arrested but
not ultimately found guilty. If arrestees fall on the Kincade side of the
"jurisprudentially sound analytic distinction," then Judge Kozinski may be
right that a loophole will soon be swallowing the Fourth Amendment. 95
As for the governmental interest, Judge Young seems to have a solid
grasp of the major issues involved. 196 The Kincade plurality employs the
government interest in supervising probationers. 197 Judge Young's rejection
of this on the ground that the rationale of the case law supporting this
governmental interest does not apply to DNA' 98 contains persuasive force
that is equally applicable in the context of arrestees. If past case law, such as
Schmerber, is founded on the idea that the intrusion is justified by the
government's interest in preventing the destruction of evidence (such as
alcohol in blood), then the government cannot have a very strong interest in
DNA as destructible evidence simply because the DNA contained in an
arrestee's body cannot be destroyed, and therefore cannot thwart government
prosecution for a specific crime. The police should properly get a warrant if
they have reason to suspect DNA will be useful evidence. Thus, a
governmental interest in supervising former arrestees-particularly those that
have ultimately not been found guilty--cannot be given much weight.
Indeed, because the DNA collected from arrestees not ultimately found guilty
cannot be included in any database if a state wishes to have access to CODIS,
there really cannot be any supervision at all aside from that intermediate time
during which the case is being adjudicated.
194 Id. at 832.
19 5 Id. at 872 ("[I]t's hard to see how we can keep the database from expanding to
include everybody... I'm hard pressed to see how [the plurality's test] would violate
anyone's Fourth Amendment rights.") (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
196 United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 269-270 (D. Mass. 2007) (noting
three primary governmental interests: supervising probationers, preventing recidivism
through deterrence, and promoting the expansion of DNA databases for the investigation
of past and future crimes and rejecting all three in the context of a statute requiring DNA
collection from a probationer).
197 Kincade en banc, 379 F.3d at 835.
198 Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 272.
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The governmental interest in deterring recidivism noted by the Kincade
plurality' 99 is even less persuasive in the context of arrestee statutes. As
Judge Young noted, this rationale is simply unconvincing when one
considers the fact that many of the crimes requiring DNA collection are not
ones that criminals could be deterred from committing because of a fear of
leaving DNA behind that would lead the police to your door.2 °0 When one is
asking whether individuals who are not guilty of the crime for which they've
been arrested will be deterred from committing crime in the future because
they've been forced to temporarily give the police a DNA sample, the
proposition nearly becomes laughable for two reasons. First, because the law
requires the sample be destroyed when no guilt is found, the deterrent effect
would only be temporary and would only duplicate the deterrent effect of the
pending criminal proceedings. And secondly, how strong of an interest could
the government have in deterring a group of individuals from committing
crime when that group is, by definition, one that the government does not
know has committed crime in the past? If it is a strong one, then we may be
one step away from acknowledging a strong governmental interest in
deterring all citizens from committing crime, thereby justifying a law
requiring all citizens to leave a DNA sample on file with the government. At
this point, the slippery slope will be but a fond memory.
Lastly, the government interest in promoting the expansion of DNA
databases for the investigation of past and future crimes seems to be the one
on which the government is likely to stand with the strongest footing. It is
also, however, the most broad and generalized. In many ways, this is the
rationale used by the Virginia Supreme Court in Anderson.20 Fingerprints
are absolutely useful tools in investigating past and future crime, but there
must be limits. As Judge Young noted, this interest is so generalized that the
"reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment will have no
meaning if this interest in investigating crime trumps all countervailing
concerns. 20 2 Perhaps this concern should, as Judge Young felt, be diminished
as the lack of individualized suspicion on the person targeted increases.20 3 In
the context of arrestees, they are presumed innocent until proven guilty and,
when it comes to physically intrusive searches, should be treated as members
of the general public. If probable cause exists, the police may absolutely get a
199 Kincade en banc, 379 F.3d at 833, 839.
200 Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 272 (noting the crimes that are covered but likely
won't be deterred).
201 Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 705 (Va. 2007) (stating that taking
a DNA sample is part of the process or routine "booking procedures" and not unlike
taking fingerprints).
202 Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 273.
203 Id. at 278-79.
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warrant to obtain a DNA sample, but if not, the police should not be able to
get that DNA through a law targeting people that are not guilty of the crime
for which they've been arrested.
This presumption of innocence also factors into the second prong of the
"totality of the circumstances" approach. In Kincade, the plurality found the
defendant's expectation of privacy diminished because of the fact that he was
a convicted felon.2°4 At this point, the Minnesota Court of Appeals seems to
make its most forceful point:
[B]ecause a person who has been charged is presumed innocent until proved
guilty, we see no basis for concluding that before being convicted, a
charged person's privacy expectation is different from the privacy
expectation of a person who was charged but the charge was dismissed or
the person was found not guilty.2
05
Further, the fact that arrestee statutes really only target individuals who are
not ultimately found guilty of the crime for which they've been arrested
lends further support to the notion that those affected by this law do not have
a reduced expectation of privacy. It again strains the relevance of the
"reasonableness" requirement to say that the government may target a group
it knows will not be found guilty in a court for forcible DNA collection.
It thus seems to make sense to say that statutes requiring arrestees to
submit DNA samples to police cannot be justified under the general "totality
of the circumstances" test. The Virginia Supreme Court may have provided a
way around this, however. By characterizing the DNA sample as akin to a
fingerprint,2 °6 the court rejects the notion that all physically intrusive
searches are deserving of greater scrutiny.20 7 This begs the question whether,
in the modem day, something as simple as a buccal swab really is intrusive in
a meaningful way?20 8 It is done with a Q-tip, causes no pain, and takes no
more than two seconds. It doesn't even leave any residue on the individual in
the way that fingerprinting does. Thus, DNA sampling upon arrest, at least
204 Kincade en banc, 379 F.3d at 837.
205 In re Welfare of C.T.L., Juvenile, 722 N.W.2d 484, 491-92 (Minn. Ct. App.
2006).
206 Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 706.
207 Id. (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 768 n.2 (1966)).
208 In Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), Justice Scalia's opinion for the
Court seemed to indicate that as new technologies become more pervasive in our society,
our expectation of privacy will diminish accordingly. Id. at 33-34. In the context of
buccal swabs, this author remembers submitting to them for a high school biology class
for the purpose of isolating his own DNA as part of a laboratory exercise. As these
exercises become more and more prevalent in high school and college experiences,
perhaps such swabs upon arrest will no longer be seen as deserving of extra protection?
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when done through buccal swab, may be fairly characterized by courts as
similar to fingerprinting insofar as the physical intrusiveness is concerned.
That said, it does seem a bit disingenuous to say that these statutes seek
DNA samples for the purpose of aiding the booking process. While an
ancillary benefit of taking a DNA sample may be a precise identification of
that individual within the police record-keeping system, the primary (and
perhaps the sole) purpose of the legislatures in passing these statutes is to use
the DNA sample to check against a database to see if the arrestee is wanted
in connection with any other crimes.20 9 As a result, it may be appropriate for
courts to look to legislative history to see whether it is established that the
DNA sample is necessary for the identification of the individual within the
police record-keeping system as opposed to connecting the arrestee to other
crimes. Nonetheless, if these laws are to be upheld, the "routine booking
procedures" route seems to be the best, in light of the troubles one encounters
when characterizing the governmental interest and expectation of privacy in
other ways. An alternative route, however, is to ask whether the "special
needs" test can justify these statutes.
C. Is There Any "Special Need"for Collecting DNA from Arrestees?
The best examples of application of the "special needs" test to DNA
collection statutes have been employed by Judge Gould, supplying the
critical vote in Kincade, and Judge Walker in Goord. No real consensus has
emerged on just what that precise special need is, however. In fact, it seems
to depend on whether the defendant is a prisoner, probationer, or something
else.210 The reason for this may be simply that the Supreme Court has not
sufficiently developed precisely what it meant in Ferguson and Edmond
regarding "detection of ordinary criminal wrongdoing" and "law
enforcement purposes." As a result, the standard is somewhat malleable, and,
209 Indeed, even the Virginia Supreme Court noted that Virginia had an interest in
the DNA for its usefulness in solving past and future crimes. Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 705
("the identification of suspects is relevant not only to solving the crime for which the
suspect is arrested, but also for maintaining a permanent record to solve other past and
future crimes.").
210 The Stewart court felt that Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006),
answered the question of which test to apply in favor of the "totality of the
circumstances" test. United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 269 (D. Mass. 2007)
rev'd, 532 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, Samson is notable because it permitted
suspicionless searches of parolees on the ground that the state has an interest in
supervising parolees. Samson, 547 U.S. at 843. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875-
76 (1987), however, applied the "special needs" test in the context of probationers, for
the same supervisory reason.
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to paraphrase Judge Young in Stewart, the permissibility of the statute seems
to depend largely on how one chooses to characterize the special need.2 1
Before Judge O'Scannlain opted against applying the "special needs" test
for the plurality in Kincade, he subtly commented on the doctrine by noting
that, "[a]lmost as soon as the 'special needs' rationale was articulated... the
Court applied special needs analysis in what seemed-at least on the
surface-to be a clear law enforcement context."212 Despite this indication
that he believes the doctrine should not be wholly separate from situations
where criminal enforcement is involved, he saw the doctrine as foreclosed by
Ferguson and Edmond and proceeded to apply the "totality of the
circumstances" test instead.213
Judge Gould did apply the "special needs" test, however; he stated the
special need as that of running a supervised release system for the purpose of
providing deterrence against recidivism. 214 As mentioned above, however,
this rationale is ultimately unconvincing in the context of arrestee statutes:
aside from the fact that arrestees retain a much higher expectation of privacy
than supervised releasees, the deterrent effect on arrestees who are not guilty
is minimal at best.215 Beyond this, Judge Gould distinguished this need from
the kind of "general law enforcement" prohibited by Ferguson and Edmond
by noting a difference between general law enforcement activities aimed at
past crime and those "with the purposes to deter future crime. 216 If this
distinction is a valid one, it cuts against finding a special need in arrestee
DNA collection statutes. The primary purpose of collecting DNA from
arrestees and comparing it to a DNA database is to check if that individual
has committed any crime in the past. Further, the prevention or investigation
of future crime is only aided by collecting the DNA of arrestees who are
ultimately found guilty. Instead, the potential to prevent or investigate future
crimes committed by arrestees who are not ultimately found guilty-the real
target of the laws-is undercut by the fact that the law requires their DNA to
be expunged from the system after a certain period of time. Thus, the
distinction is not a relevant one in the context of arrestee DNA collection
statutes.
Judge Gould would likely agree, however, because as soon as he
mentions this distinction he also notes what he is not deciding in his opinion:
211 See Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 269. ("The outcome of the balancing is largely
determined by how the two weights in the balance are characterized.").
212 Kincade en banc, 379 F.3d at 824.
213 Id. at 831-32.
214 Id. at 840.
215 Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 272; see also, supra Part IV.B.
216 Kincade en banc, 379 F.3d at 840.
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"What we do not have before us is a petitioner who has fully paid his or her
debt to society... and who has left the penal system., 217 This statement
limits the value of Judge Gould's opinion with respect to arrestee statutes
because, as is obvious, arrestees have never even had a debt to pay, let alone
been serving in the penal system. If Judge Gould was concerned with
convicted persons who had "fully paid [their] debt to society," it does not
seem to be a stretch to say that he would be equally concerned with arrestees.
Judge Reinhardt agreed with Judge Gould that the "special needs" test
should apply, but disagreed with its effect in this case.218 His reliance on
Lidster for the notion that special needs "may not include efforts to obtain
information related to possible crimes that the searched individual may have
committed" 219 is instructive in the context of arrestees. The whole reason
collecting this DNA is desirable is to find out whether the searched may have
committed any other crimes.22°
Judge Walker spins Lidster the other way in Goord, however.221 He cites
Lidster for the notion that searches generally done for "information-seeking"
are permissible while searches generally done to detect evidence of "ordinary
criminal wrongdoing" are not. 2 This reasoning blurs the line between
information and evidence, however. It is true that taking DNA from an
arrestee provides the police with "information;" however, it is a bit of a
denial of reality to fail to acknowledge that the information sought is
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing committed by that individual. In
Lidster, the information sought was said to be about others, not the person
searched.223 Thus, Lidster seems to support Judge Reinhardt's view in this
context.
217 Id. at 841.
218 Id. at 854; Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423 (2004).
2 19 Kincade en banc, 379 F.3d at 854-55 (noting that Lidster involved a road
checkpoint in which the police sought information from individuals about a fatal hit-and-
run that had occurred at that location a week earlier).
220 That said, because DNA provides information about your close relatives as well,
see supra note 17 and accompanying text, one could imagine police seeking to obtain one
person's DNA simply to see if a relative suspected of a crime, but unavailable to police,
should be considered further. This scenario is a bit far-fetched, however, and is simply
not the primary reason why arrestee DNA is sought.
221 Goord, 430 F.3d at 668.
222 Id.
223 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 423 ("The stop's primary law enforcement purpose was not
to determine whether a vehicle's occupants were committing a crime, but to ask vehicle
occupants, as members of the public, for their help in providing information about a
crime in all likelihood committed by others. The police expected the information elicited
to help them apprehend, not the vehicle's occupants, but other individuals.") (second
emphasis added).
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Aside from these views expressed in Kincade and Goord, one is left to
wonder what other special needs might be stated for arrestee statutes.
Because the Supreme Court has yet to clarify precisely what was meant in
Ferguson and Edmond, lower courts have seemed free to mold this malleable
standard however they see fit. If the prohibition is intended to be a broad one,
DNA collection statutes will likely be unconstitutional. There has not been a
definitive statement from the Court, however, that the mere presence of one
purpose related to detection of criminal wrongdoing is enough to strike a law.
And to further complicate things, some searches can be "multi-purpose"
searches-where the primary purpose is civil or administrative, but has
detection of criminal wrongdoing as an incidental purpose or additional
effect.224 Professor Maclin notes that the Supreme Court has indicated an
acceptance of this "interpretative surgery" in New York v. Burger.225 The
New York statute in Burger permitted warrantless, suspicionless searches of
junkyard dealers.226 The Supreme Court upheld the law, noting that the New
York Court of Appeals had "failed to recognize that a State can address a
major social problem both by way of an administrative scheme and through
penal sanctions." 227 If the primary purpose is that of an administrative search,
then an incidental "contribution" to criminal law enforcement does not
render the law invalid.228
Professor Maclin notes that a similar strategy could be employed here in
the context of arrestees: perhaps the state has an administrative interest in
"discerning the true identities of individuals subject to arrest. 229 Thus, any
incidental effect in aid of detecting criminal wrongdoing does not render the
statute outside the scope of special needs. Professor Maclin agrees with
others, however, that have found this description of the purposes of arrestee
statutes disingenuous.23° Ultimately, Professor Maclin believes that this
"interpretative surgery" will not carry the day.23'
Though this author agrees with this reasoning, it is submitted that one
should not underestimate the degree to which it is likely that arrestee DNA
statutes actually will be upheld on grounds similar to this, especially in light
224 See Maclin, supra note 19, at 180.
225 I.; 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
226 Burger, 482 U.S. at 691.
227 Id. at 712.
2 2 8 Id. at 716.
229 Maclin, supra note 19, at 180-81.
230 Id. at 181 (quoting David H. Kaye, Two Fallacies About DNA Data Banks for
Law Enforcement, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 179, 203 (2001) ("The legislative interest in DNA
data bases has not been primarily to supplement or supplant fingerprints as markers of
true identity; it has always been to generate investigative leads.").
231 Maclin, supra note 19, at 181.
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of opinions such as the one in Anderson. The usefulness of DNA as an
identifier of individuals does have application beyond the investigative stage
of law enforcement. In an effort to avoid statutes of limitation, police have
begun indicting the DNA found at a crime scene as the true identity of the
232perpetrator. In this regard, DNA technology is being employed as an
identifier far more precise than a name-something more akin to a bar code.
Given the fact that individuals may, and often do, seek to lie to the police
about their identity, it does not seem too far-fetched to think that using DNA
as a "lie-proof' form of identification that is far more accurate-and
impossible to destroy, unlike fingerprints-can be a legitimate interest of the
government. A defense against a statute claimed to be unconstitutional would
do well to attempt to establish a record of police need for precise
identification of arrestees. The next chance the Court has to address the
"special needs" test may well result in a refinement of the prohibition of
searches for detection of "ordinary criminal wrongdoing" to meet the needs
and prevalent uses of DNA technology in our society.
As a result, it does not seem to be impossible that DNA collection
statutes focusing on arrestees could be upheld against constitutional attack,
either on the grounds that DNA sampling is so common and so minimally
intrusive that it passes the general "totality of the circumstances" test or
because of a "special need" to discern the true identity of an arrestee. Despite
this, however, the fact that such laws really target individuals who are not
guilty of the crimes for which they've been arrested, occur without individual
suspicion, and seem to simply advance an interest in ordinary law
enforcement counsels against a finding of constitutionality under the Fourth
Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
The last eighteen years have seen the birth and an immense expansion of
the use of our genetic material in law enforcement, culminating with DNA
databases that currently hold the DNA profiles of over five million people.
Statutes requiring convicted persons to provide DNA samples have arisen in
one form or another in every state. Challenges to these statutes have
uniformly failed, however, fourteen states now require certain groups of
arrestees to submit their DNA as well. The legal challenges to these laws
have not provided much case law as of yet, but as DNA technology becomes
232 Court TV, Indicting John Doe: When All You Have is DNA, CNN.CoM,
December 31, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/law/12/10/court.indicting.dna; see
also Andrew C. Bernasconi, Comment, Beyond Fingerprinting: Indicting DNA Threatens
Criminal Defendants' Constitutional and Statutory Rights, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 979, 981-
82 (2001).
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more and more capable of exposing highly personal information, our
experience should guide us to believe that a line must be drawn somewhere.
Unless we are comfortable with universal DNA collection and retention by
the government, it is necessary to push back against the rising tide of statutes
seeking to force more and more individuals to submit to DNA collection.
Because neither the "totality of the circumstances" test nor the "special
needs" test provide wholly satisfactory justifications for DNA collection
from arrestees, these statutes should be found unconstitutional.
